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06 June 1985

Geoffrey Butler, Esq.
Utah Supreme Court
Room 332
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Utah v. Vijil, No, 20111

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, the
appellant wishes to advise the Court of certain supplemental citations
which are pertinent to his appeal.
First, at page seven (7) of the Appellantfsi Reply Brief, reference is made to the procedures of Title 78, Chapter 4pb of the Utah Code.
The procedures applicable to the present case are outlined at section 7845b-5 for, as the Notice of Support Debt shows in its! caption, this case
was a proceeding without a court order. Consequently, it is procedures
in section 78-45b-5 which must be examined to determine whether federal
law preempts their application to a Reservation-domiciled Navajo Indian.
I
Second, the appellant draws the Court's attention to the recent
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, No. 84-68. As the decision deals with the T)ower of the Navajo
Tribe to apply their tax laws to non-Indian corporations, it does not
correspond to any specific argument made in the appellant's briefs. However, the appellant does believe that the Court's stirong affirmation of
tribal, especially Navajo, sovereignty is worthy of attention in any case,
such as the present one, where tribal sovereignty is at issue.
Yours sincerely,

Steven Boc
Attorney at Lajw
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cc:

Mark Wainwright, Esq.
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Herb Yazzie, Esq.
NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Post Office Drawer 2010
Window Rock, Arizona 86515
Bruce K. Halliday, Esq.
San Juan County Courthouse
Monticello, Utah 84535
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

KERR-McGEE CORP- u NAVAJO TRI$E OF
INDIANS ETAL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 84-68. Argued February 25,1985—Decided April 16, 1985
The Tribal Council of respondent Navajo Tribe enacted ordinances imposing taxes on the value of leasehold iuteicsLa in tribal lands and on
receipts from the sale of property produced or extracted or the sale of
services within those lands. Petitioner, a mineral lessee on the Navajo
Reservation, brought an action in Federal District Court, claiming that
the taxes were invalid without approval of the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary). The District Court agreed and enjoined the Tribefromenforcing the tax laws against petitioner. The Court of-Appeals reversed,
holding that no federal statute or principle of law mandated approval by
the Secretary.
Htld: The Secretary's approval of the taxes in question is not required.
Pp. 2-6.
(a) While 116 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 requires a
tribal constitution written under the Act to be approved by the Secretary, the Act does not require the constitution to condition the power to
tax on the Secretary's approval In any event, the Act does not govern
tribes, Hke the Navajo, that declined to accept its provisions. And
there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended to recognize as legitimate only those tribal taxes authorised by constitutions written under
the Act. Pp.2-4.
(b) Nor does the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 198^ require the Secondary's cppnnral of the Navajo taxes. WhQe f4 of the Act subjects
mineral leases issued under the Act to regulations promulgated by'the
Secretaryf the regulations have not required that triW taxes im mineral
production be ml Knitted for his approval. In enacting 149 Congress
could ptupeily make a distinction between a tribe acting as a cofameidal
partner in selling the right to use its land for mineral production and
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acting as a sovereign in imposing taxes on activities within its jurisdiction- And even aaprming that the Secretary could review tribal taxes
on mineral production, it does not follow that be must do so. Pp. 4-5.
(c) Nor do statutes requiring the Secretary's supervision in other contexts tadkste that Congress has limited the Navajo Tribal Council's
authority to tax non-Indians. Use power to tax members and nonmsmbers of a tribe alike is an essential attribute of the t r i l ^ self-government that the Federal Government is committed to promote. P. 5.
731 F. 2d 597, affirmed.
BURGER, C. J M delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members
joined, except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

NOTICE:TO*opfafeo ts «abWt toformalrrnckxi before wibKeatkto in tho
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-68

KERR-McGEE CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.
NAVAJO TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATEfe COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[April 16,19861
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
***n xisiiu-I ZSL\J2L^L\ *n is=re Vrsslffr *i** ^ s r s o "^rb*
ol Innians may tax business activities comnrced on its ianu
without first obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.
i
In 1978, the Navajo Tribal Council, the governingbody of
the Navajo Tribe of Indians, enacted two ordinances imposing taxes known as the Possessory Interest Tax and the Business Activity Tax. The Possessory Interest Tax is measured by the value of leasehold interests in tribal lands; the
tax rate is 8% of the value of those interests. The Business
Activity Tax is assessed on receiptsfromthe sale of property
produced or extracted within the Navajo Nation, and from
the sale of services within the Nation; a tax rate of 5% is
applied after subtracting a standard deduction and specified expensesr^The tax laws apply to both Navajo and nonjlndian businesses, with dissatisfied taxpayers enjoying the
right of appeal to the Navajo Tax Commission and the
Navsjo Ccurt of Appeals.
The Navajo Tribe, uncertain whetherfederalapproval was
required, submitted the two tax laws to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs of the Department of the Interior. The Bureau.
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informed the Tribe that no federal statute or regulBtion
required the Department of the Interior to approve or disapprove the taxes.
Before any taxes were coDected, petitioner, a substantial
mineral lessee on the Navajo Reservation, brought this action seeking to invalidate the taxes. Petitioner Claimed in
the United States District Court for the District jrf Arizona
that the Navajo taxes were invalid without approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. The District Court Agreed and
permanently enjoined the Tribe from enforcing itjs tax laws
against petitioner.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ni^ith Circuit
reversed. 731 F. 2d 597 (1984). Relying on [Southland
Royalty. Co, v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 715 F. 2d 486 (CA10
1983), it held that no federal statute or principle ot law mandated Secretarial approval.1
We granted certiorari 469 U. S.
(1984). [We affirm.
II
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982),
we held that the "power to tax is an essential attribute of
Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of
self-government and territorial management.n id., at 137.
Congress, of course, may erect "checkpoints th^t must be
cleared before a tribal tax can take effect." Id., attl55. The
issue in this case is whether Congress has enacted! legislation
requiring Secretarial approval of Navajo tax law$.
Petitioner suggests that the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. $461 et seq., is such a law.
Section 16 of the IRA authorises any tribe on a reservation to
adopt a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U. S. C. 5476. The Act,
*Ti* Ninth Circuit reacted petttfaoerV ether e o c i ^
todndad Comnwrce Cbcwe md contractual ehaHesgts to the two taxes.
Petitioner fcu not sought review of this acpeet of the Coajtof Appeals'
Judgment,
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however, does not provide that 2 tribal constitution must
condition the power to tax on Secretarial approval Indeed,
the terms of the IRA do not govern tribes, like the Navajo,
which declined to accept its provisions. 25 U. S. C. §478.
Many tribal constitutions written under the IRA in the
1930*8 called for Secretarial approval of tax laws affecting
non-Indians. See, e. g., Constitution and Bjdaws of the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, Art. 4, § 1(h) (1935).
But there were exceptions to this practice. For example,
the 1937 Constitution and By-laws of the Saginaw Chippewa
Indian Tribe of Michigan authorized the Tribal Council, without Secretarial approval, to "create and maintain a tribal
council fund by . . . levying taxes or assessments against
members or non-members.n Art 4, § 1(g). Tfrus the most
that can be said about this period of constitution writing is
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in assisting the drafting of
->*ribal constitutions, had a policy of including provisions for
Secretarial approval; but that policy was not mandated by
Congress.
Nor do we agree that Congress intended to recognize as
legitimate only those tribal taxes authorized by constitutions
written under the IRA.1 Long before the IRA was enacted,
the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged ^he validity of
a tax imposed by the Chickasaw Nation on non-Indians. See
S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2 (1^79). And in
1934, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior published a formal opinion stating that a tribe possesses "the
power of taxation [which] may be exercised ovet members of
the tribe and over nonmembers." Fowert oflitdian Tribes,
55 I. D. 14, 46. The 73rd Congress, in passing the IRA to
advance tribal self-government, see WUliamq v. Lee, 358
JU9ervationfM7V. S. 1M, 152-154 (15S0), wt uotamed taxes impoeedon
oomMSobsn by the CotrQto end Lctxnnn Tribes rren tboofh tba Tribes
rwmrn not orgjmiiad under-the IRA
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U. S. 217, 220 (1859), did nothing to limit the established,
pre-existing power of the Navnjos to levy taxes.
* Some tribes that adopted constitutions in the ea^ly years of
the IRA may be dependent on the Government in a way that
the Navajos are not However, such tribes are free, with
the backing of the Interior Department, to amend their constitutions to remove the requirement of Secretarial approval
. See, e. gr., Revised Constitution and Bylaws ofJthe Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Art 8, § l(r) (1975).
Petitioner also argues that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938, 52 Stat. 847,25 U. S. C. §3S6a et seg., requires Secretarial approval of Navajo tax laws. Sections 1 ^hrough 3 of
the 1988 Act establish procedures for leasing oil knd gas interests on tribal lands. And §4 provides that *j[a]U operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuttitto the [Act] shall be subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior." £5 U. S. C.
§336d. Under this grant erf authority, the Sectary has
issued comprehensive regulations governing the Operation of
ml and gas leases. . See 25 CFR pt 211 (1984). The Secretary, however, does not demand that tribal laws taxing mineral production be submitted for his approval
Petitioner contends that the Secretary's decision not to
review such tax laws is inconsistent with the statute. In
we emphasized the difference between a tribe's
*role as commercial partner,'* and its "role as Sovereign."
455 U. &f at 145-146. The tribe acts as a commercial partner when it agrees to sell the right to the use of its land for
mineral production, but the tribe sets as a sovereign when it
imposes a tax on economic activities within its jurisdiction*
J&, at 146; ct White v. Massachusetts Council pfComtrue'
*k*Efnploy*nj7*.,4lto\J.&
Plainly
Congress, in passing f 4 of the 1838 Act, «mld make this
^Bvenaasmning thfit the Secretary couldreviewtribal laws
taxing mineral production, it does not follow that he must do
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so. We are not inclined to impose upon the Secretary a duty
that he has determined is not needed to satisfy the 1338 Act's
basic pttrpose-*-to maximize tribal revenuesfromreservation
lands. See S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3
(1937). Thus, in light of our obligation to "tread lightly in
the absence of clear indications of legislative indent,n Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (19f78), vre will
not interpret a grant of authority to regulate leasing operations as a command to the Secretary to review pvery tribal
tax relating to mineral production.3
I
Finally, we do not believe that statutes requiring Secretarial supervision in other contexts, see, e. <?., 25 U. S. C.
§§81, 311-321, reveal that Congress has limited the Navajo
Tribal Council's authority to tax non-Indians. As we noted
in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 4^2 U. S. 324
(1983), the Federal Government is "firmly comrpitted to the
goal of promoting tribal self-government.n Id.* at 334-335;
see, e. g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat 77, 25
U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. The power to tax mempers and nonIndians alike is surely an essential attribute of such selfgovernment; the Navajos can gain independence from the
Federal Government only byfinancingtheir own police force,
schools, and social programs. See President's Statement on
Indian Policy, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc' 98^99 (Jan. 24,
1983).

in
The Navajo government has been called "probably the
most elaborate" among tribes. H. R. Rep. No. 78, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1969). The legitimacy of the Navajo
Tribal Council, the freely elected governing body of the
•Section 2 of the 1838 Act pcptidea a limited exemptionfortribes org*atod tmder the IRA 25 U. S. C. 1898b. Because we ^oodnde that the
1938 Act does not rtqnire the Secretary to renew tribal taxes, however,
the Ntnjo Tribe's dedakm not to accept the IRA ii irre^erazxt.
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Navajos, is beyond question*4 See, e. g.9 25 U. S. C.
55635(b), 637, 638. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that neither Congress nor the Navajos have fotmd it necessary to subject the Tribal Council's tax laws to review by the
Secretary of the Interior; accordingly, the judgment is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or deci-

sion in this case.

*Tb* Tribal Comal has 88 member* who art ejected e v ^ four years.
33*re are approximate^
persons voted in the last tribal flection in 1962.

